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COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND
AND ITS IMPACT ON CLEAN WATER ACT
JURISPRUDENCE
SYDNEY BALE**
Introduction
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”), originally the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948, is the principal law governing water pollution into the
United States’s waterways. 1 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1948 was the first statute to address water pollution. 2 In 1972, this act was
amended and renamed the “Clean Water Act.” 3 The CWA “forbids ‘any
addition’ of any pollutant from ‘any point source’ to ‘navigable waters’
without an appropriate permit from the [EPA].”4 Congress’s goal in
enacting such legislation, reflected in the CWA’s language, is to “‘restore
and maintain . . . the integrity of the Nation’s waters.’” 5 Congress
established conditions and created a permit system for persons wishing to
“discharge . . . pollutants into the waterways of the United States under the
 140 S.Ct. 1462 (2020).
** University of Oklahoma College of Law J.D. Candidate 2022. I would like to thank
my faculty advisor, Professor M. Alexander Pearl, for not only his expertise in both statutory
interpretation and water law but also for his assistance with this article.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. § 12511388.
4. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1468.
5. Id.
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National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”).”6 The CWA
also gives “the [EPA] the authority to implement pollution control
programs such as setting wastewater standards for industry and water
quality standards for all contaminants in surface waters.”7 However, the Act
is criticized for being vague because “Congress’ basic aim [is] to provide
federal regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable
waters without undermining the States’ longstanding regulatory authority
over land and groundwater.”8 Persons discharging pollutants, attorneys, and
judges struggle to determine the scope of the CWA, resulting in
inconsistency, confusion, and ambiguity.
The Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation of the CWA, County of
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,9 explored the provision forbidding the
discharge of any pollutant from a point source to navigable waters without a
permit from the EPA. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held “from a point
source” to mean either directly from a point source or from the “functional
equivalent of a direct discharge.”10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address a split amongst the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts
regarding the test to determine whether discharge of pollutants from a point
source requires a permit under the CWA. 11 The Court also granted certiorari
to address a loophole that was beginning to form that would allow polluters
to avoid a permit if they discharged into groundwater instead of directly
into navigable waters.12
Critics, like dissenters Justice Alito and Justice Thomas, argue the
Supreme Court created too broad a rule to be used in future CWA suits
which will ultimately lead to ambiguous and inconsistent holdings. 13 While
6. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Clean Water Act (CWA), https://www.
boem.gov/environment/environmental-assessment/clean-water-act-cwa#:~:text=The%20
CWA%20establishes%20conditions%20and,such%20as%20setting%20wastewater%20stan
dards (last visited Nov. 14, 2020) (quotations added).
7. Id.
8. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. 1462, 1476 (2020) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251).
9. Id. at 1462.
10. Id. at 1476.
11. See Id. at 1469. The Supreme Court granted certiorari based on the discrepancies
between the Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable,” the Fourth Circuit’s “direct hydrological
connection” in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P, 887 F.3d 637, 651
(4th Cir. 2018), and the Sixth Circuit’s “discharge through groundwater [is] excluded from
the Act’s permitting requirements” in Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Util. Co.,
905 F.3d 925, 932-938 (6th Cir. 2018).
12. Id. at 1473.
13. Id. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the Court’s decision in County of Maui does create a broad rule, it is the
right decision by the Court to ensure States’ rights and the purpose of the
CWA remains intact. The language of the CWA is intended to be vague and
the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Maui creates a rule to help
navigate the statute’s vague language while also ensuring that States’ rights
in controlling groundwater, the EPA’s job of issuing permits, and
Congress’s intent in drafting the CWA, are not infringed upon. 14
Put another way, the Supreme Court had two options: (1) allow this
loophole to the CWA’s permit system to happen by deciding in favor of the
County of Maui and let future polluters circumvent the permit process or
(2) create a rule that would ensure such a loophole would not occur in the
future. By deciding upon the latter, the Court ensured future polluters
would not be able to avoid the CWA’s permit requirements by polluting
into groundwater instead of directly into navigable waters; however, in
order to do so, the Court had to create a broad rule that critics argue will
lead to ambiguities.15 The Court issued guidance in the form of factors to
weigh when determining future CWA cases regarding a nonpoint source
like groundwater to help prevent inconsistent holdings in the future. 16 While
the Court’s new rule is broad, it ensures Congress’s purpose for enacting
the CWA remains unadulterated—protecting the waters of the United States
from pollution.17

14. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence discussing the unique and difficult role the Supreme Court is
faced with when deciphering CWA cases) (“The source of vagueness is Congress’ statutory
text, not the Court’s opinion. The Court’s opinion seeks to translate the vague statutory text
into more concrete guidance.”).
15. Id. at 1482-3 (Alito, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s holding and creation
of the direct discharge or “functional equivalent of direct discharge” rule: “[i]f the Court is
going to devise its own legal rules, instead of interpreting those enacted by Congress, it
might at least adopt rules that can be applied with a modicum of consistency. Here, however,
the Court makes up a rule that provides no clear guidance and invites arbitrary and
inconsistent application.”).
16. See Id. at 1477, for some of the factors the court discusses to help alleviate
confusion for judges in their attempt to decipher the CWA: “(1) transit time, (2) distance
traveled, (3) the nature of the material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to
which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount of pollutant
entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point
source, (6) the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, (7) the
degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity. Time and
distance will be the most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.”
17. See Justice Kavanaugh’s discussion, supra note 14.
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The aim of this Note is to analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in
County of Maui and illustrate why the Court’s majority opinion is the
correct decision. This Note is broken into four parts. First, I will explain the
CWA and the CWA cases that led to the Supreme Court granting certiorari
for County of Maui. I will specifically look at the circuit split regarding the
proper test to determine whether a permit is required for discharge through
groundwater, and Rapanos v. United States, another major CWA case that
occurred prior to County of Maui. Second, I will discuss the facts, issue, and
holding in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, with special focus on
how the Supreme Court reached its decision, Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurrence, and Justice Thomas and Justice Alito’s dissents. Third, I will
explain why statutory interpretation is so critical in County of Maui, by
discussing why the EPA’s interpretive statement was not binding on the
Court’s decision, why the Court had to create such a broad rule, and the
different theories of statutory interpretation utilized in the Court’s decision
to support the majority rule. Lastly, I will address the future of CWA
jurisprudence and how courts will interpret and utilize County of Maui in
future opinions by debunking Justice Alito’s criticisms about the majority’s
“functional equivalent of a direct discharge” test. 18
I. The Clean Water Act Prior to County of Maui
A. The Clean Water Act Defined
Before the CWA,19 “[f]ederal and [s]tate governments regulated water
pollution in large part by setting water quality standards.”20 In 1948,
Congress enacted The Federal Water Pollution Control Act to address water
pollution. 21 As the country grew more aware of water pollution, the Act was
amended in 1972 to account for the country’s changing awareness and
personal investment in water quality. 22 In 1972, the Act became known as
18. See Id. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting), Justice Alito, in his dissent, questions and
criticizes the ambiguities and holes in the majority created rule: “[j]ust what is the
‘functional equivalent’ of a ‘direct discharge’? The Court provides no real answer. All it will
say is that the distance a pollutant travels and the time this trip entails are the most important
factors, but at least five other factors may have a bearing on the question, and even this list
is not exhaustive.”
19. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388 (2012).
20. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1468.
21. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388 (2012).
22. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Laws & Regulations, History of the Clean
Water Act (last updated June 15, 2020), available at https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/history-clean-water-act.
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the “Clean Water Act.”23 The stated objective of the CWA by Congress is
“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters” as well as to “recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration,
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.”24
The CWA “forbids ‘any addition’ of any pollutant from ‘any point
source’ to ‘navigable waters’ without an appropriate permit from the
[EPA].”25 A principal provision of the CWA’s regulatory power is
addressed in the United States Code, Title 33, Section 1311(a), which
provides that “the discharge of any person shall be unlawful.” 26 The CWA
defines “discharge of [a] pollutant” as the “addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source.”27 “Pollutant” is defined broadly as
“to include not only traditional contaminants but also solids such as ‘dredge
spoil, . . . rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt.”28 “Point source” includes “‘any pipe,
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 29 And lastly,
“navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas.”30
To determine whether a person is required to apply for a permit under
the CWA, courts must determine whether “the addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source” has occurred. 31 While this question
seems straight forward, courts have struggled to answer it. The CWA’s
complicated jurisprudence is evident in the Supreme Court’s holding,
Rapanos v. United States, in which the Court, in a plurality opinion,
addressed the meaning of “the waters” in the CWA. 32 Prior to the enactment
of the CWA, “navigable waters of the United States” referred to waters that
were “navigable in fact.”33 “Navigable in fact” is how courts originally
23. Id.
24. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006) (citing 33 U.S.C. §1251(a-b)).
25. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1468.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1363(14).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
31. Id.
32. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 733.
33. Id. at 723 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870), explaining how the
Court interpreted “navigable waters of the United States” prior to the CWA’s enactment).
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interpreted “navigable waters of the United States” following the passage of
the CWA. 34
B. Rapanos v. United States 35
The issue before the Court, in Rapanos, was whether the CWA’s “waters
of the United States” included a wetland that occasionally emptied into a
tributary of a traditionally “navigable water.” The divided Court rejected, in
a plurality opinion, this idea that “waters of the United States” meant
“navigable in fact” because the Congress defined “navigable waters” in the
CWA as “waters of the United States.”36 The Court in Rapanos, defined
“the waters,” narrowly, to mean “water ‘[a]s found in streams and bodies
forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ or ‘the
flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams
or bodies.’”37 The Court noted that the CWA defines “navigable waters” as
“the waters of the United States” not “waters of the United States.” 38 This
distinction is critical because it shows Congress did not intend to include all
bodies of water but rather a narrower definition of waters to include only
“streams and bodies forming geographical features” like an ocean, river,
lake, stream, etc. and not water that “occasionally or intermittently flows.” 39
The Court determined that “the waters of the United States” did not include
“channels containing merely intermittent or ephemeral flow,” but does
include “relatively permanent bodies of water.”40 However, the Court chose
to not go into too much detail regarding “the precise extent to which the
qualifiers ‘navigable’ and ‘of the United States’ restrict the coverage of the
Act. Whatever the scope of these qualifiers, the CWA authorizes federal
jurisdiction only over ‘waters.’”41
The plurality opinion in Rapanos went on to say the CWA does not
prohibit the “addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters,” it says,
“addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.”42 This differentiation is
noted in Scalia’s plurality opinion because previous interpretation of the
CWA by lower courts has led to decisions that said “any pollutant that
34. Id.
35. See generally Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), for the Court’s definition of the
CWA’s “waters of the United States.”
36. Id. at 730.
37. Id. at 732.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 732.
40. Id. at 733-34.
41. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 743.
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naturally washes downstream likely violates [section] 1311(a), even if the
pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’
covered waters, but pass ‘through conveyances’ in between.” 43 This
assertion by the Court implies that, if looked at broadly, the CWA’s permit
requirement would be triggered if a pollutant were discharged from a point
source, through groundwater, to navigable waters, even if it is not directly
from the point source to navigable waters. An issue that is central to the
decision in County of Maui, however, the Court in County of Maui found
the dictum in Rapanos did not apply.44
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, in Rapanos, has frequently been
regarded as the governing opinion in Rapanos. Justice Kennedy framed the
question before the Court as “whether the term ‘navigable waters’ in the
Clean Water Act extends to wetlands that do not contain and are not
adjacent to waters that are navigable in fact.”45 Justice Kennedy argued the
Court should have utilized the “significant nexus” test from Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook City v. Army Corps of Engineers.46 Under the
“significant nexus” test, “a water or wetland must possess a ‘significant
nexus’ to waters that are, or were, navigable in fact or that could reasonably
be so made” to constitute as a “navigable water” in terms of the CWA. 47
Meaning, a wetland falls under federal regulation under the CWA when it
has a “significant nexus” to a traditional navigable water. The “significant
nexus” requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant impact on
the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of bodies of water that are
“more readily understood as navigable.” 48
C. The Circuit Split Which Led to the Supreme Court Granting Certiorari
in County of Maui
In addition to the complicated precedent the Court set in Rapanos
regarding the CWA, a circuit split amongst the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
43. Id.
44. See generally County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. 1462 (2020).
45. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
47. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 780. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and
thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
‘navigable.’ When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative or
insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable
waters.’”).
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Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts’ regarding the appropriate test to
determine if a discharge through groundwater to navigable waters requires a
permit had been created. In 2018, the Fourth Circuit considered the
Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan
Energy Partners, L.P., and held “a plaintiff must allege a direct
hydrological connection between groundwater and navigable waters in
order to state a claim under the CWA for a discharge of a pollutant that
passes through ground water.”49 The Fourth Circuit determined “[j]ust as
the CWA’s definition of a discharge of a pollutant does not require a
discharge directly to navigable waters, [] neither does the Act require a
discharge directly from a point source.” 50 However, the Supreme Court’s
holding in Rapanos and the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Upstate Forever
were not extended to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Kentucky Waterways
Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Company.51 In Kentucky Waterways Alliance,
the Sixth Circuit held “when the pollutants are discharged to [a] lake, they
are not coming from a point source; they are coming from groundwater,
which is a nonpoint-source conveyance. The CWA has no say over that
conduct.”52 The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Kentucky Waterways Alliance
fell more in line with the Fifth Circuit in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.,53
where the court also heard a CWA case regarding pollutants being
discharged through groundwater to navigable waters. The Fifth Circuit held
that Congress did not intend to regulate groundwater in the CWA.
Therefore, the CWA’s “navigable waters” does not include conveyances via
groundwater.54 The Sixth and Fifth Circuit’s decisions followed the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in 1994 in Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton
Hudson Corp.55 In Village of Oconomowoc Lake, the Seventh Circuit held
regulation of groundwater fell to the states and therefore, it was not an
oversight by Congress to omit groundwater from the text of the CWA. 56
The Seventh Circuit explained that the CWA states “waters of the United
States,” not all waters.57

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id.
905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 934.
250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 272.
24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 965.
Id.
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The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits found the CWA did not include
groundwater conveyances, while the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court’s plurality opinion in Rapanos—if read expansively—held the CWA
did include groundwater.58 The difference between the holdings in the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits comes down to interpreting the
same sentence of the CWA and yet, there is an astounding difference in
outcomes. The language of the CWA is not complex; rather it is the
simplicity of its language that creates vagueness. Legal scholars and CWA
interpreters argue the reason for the CWA’s complicating past stems from
“Congress . . . [leaving] gaps and ambiguities in the statutory test, including
the unexplained or poorly explained use of multiple terms for seemingly
similar or identical issues.”59 Take “[f]or example, Congress established an
overall objective to ‘restore and maintain . . . the Nation’s waters,’ but then
applied the Act’s regulatory controls to ‘navigable waters,’ which it then redefined to ‘the waters of the United States.’” 60
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on County of Maui because of the
inconsistent holdings amongst the circuit courts regarding whether
discharges from a point source through groundwater to navigable waters is
covered under the CWA. The Court also granted certiorari to determine
whether the plurality opinion in Rapanos was binding on CWA
jurisprudence.
II. County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund
A. Facts and Procedural History
In the Supreme Court’s October 2019 Term, the Court heard the most
recent CWA case, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund.61 The County
of Maui owns and operates a wastewater reclamation facility, the Lahaina
Wastewater Reclamation Facility, that collects sewage from the
58. While the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Rapanos does not explicitly discuss
groundwater, if read expansively, groundwater can be included in the Rapanos Court’s
interpretation of the CWA, “discharging . . . pollutants into noncovered intermittent
watercourses that lie upstream of covered waters” does not “evade the permitting
requirement of [the CWA].” County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. 1462, 1478-9 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (arguing Rapanos does resolve the matter in County of Maui because the
Rapanos plurality found discharge that passes through intermittent channels before reaching
navigable waters is not necessarily exempt from the CWA’s permit requirement.).
59. Robert W. Adler & Brian House, Atomizing the Clean Water Act: Ignoring the
Whole Statute and Asking the Wrong Questions, 50 ENVTL. L. 45, 47 (2020).
60. Id. at n.6. (citations omitted).
61. 140 S.Ct. 1462 (2020).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

560

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

surrounding area, partially treats it, and then pumps the treated water into
the ground through wells.62 Four million gallons of treated sewage water
then travel half a mile through groundwater to the Pacific Ocean. 63
In 2012, several environmental groups (“Hawaii Wildlife Fund”) brought
suit against the County of Maui for violating the Clean Water Act, claiming
the County was “discharging” a “pollutant” to “navigable waters.”64 The
District Court for the District of Hawaii held the County’s discharge of
pollutants into groundwater was “functionally one into navigable water”
because the pollutants in the ocean were traceable to the reclamation
facility.65 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Hawaii
Wildlife Fund because the pollutants path from the reclamation site to the
ocean was “clearly ascertainable,” the County appealed, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding. 66 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
but took a broader approach by saying a permit is required under the CWA
when “the pollutants are fairly traceable from the point source to a
navigable water.”67 The Ninth Circuit chose to not answer what happens
when the distance between the point source and navigable water is too far
apart to determine a connection regarding liability. 68 The Supreme Court
granted the County’s petition for certiorari due to the circuit split between
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and, now, Ninth Circuit Courts regarding
the causal relationship between the point source and navigable waters in the
language of the CWA.69
B. The Supreme Court’s Holding
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the CWA requires a
person to obtain a permit when discharging pollutants from a point source
to navigable waters via groundwater. 70 To put it another way, whether
“from” means “directly from” or “fairly traceable from.” 71 Hawaii Wildlife
Fund argued a permit is required if the pollutant is “fairly traceable” to a

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1469.
Id.
Id. at 1468.
Id. at 1469.
County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1469.
Id.
Id.
.Id. at 1469-70.
.Id. at 1470.
Id.
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point source, whereas the County argued a permit is only required if the
pollutant is “directly from” a point source.72
The Court held, in a 6-3 decision written by Justice Breyer, to vacate the
Ninth Circuit’s application of the statutory language and remand. 73 The
Court did not reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision as the Ninth Circuit and
the Supreme Court both ruled in favor of the Hawaii Wildlife Fund;
however, the Supreme Court reached its outcome differently than the
District and Circuit Court.74 The Court referred to the holding in Rapanos
which said, the Clean Water Act refers to “any addition of any pollutant”
meaning it is much more broad and not only limited to directly from. 75 The
Court held, under the CWA, a permit is required when there is “direct
discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the
functional equivalent of a direct discharge.”76 The Court reasoned adding
the “functional equivalent of a direct discharge” accounts for Congress’
intention to allow states authority over groundwater while also asserting
proper federal authority over discharge from an identifiable point source to
navigable waters.77
When determining whether a pollutant is a direct discharge or
“functional equivalent of a direct discharge,” the Court determined that
time and distance play an important role. 78 If the “pipe ends a few feet from
navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel those few feet
through groundwater (or over the beach), the permitting requirement clearly
applies.”79 However, “[i]f the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters and
the pipe emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other
material, and end up in navigable waters only many years later, the
permitting requirements likely do not apply.”80 The Court admits this
approach is difficult to articulate and vague because it only accounts for
those extreme instances and not the grey, middle, instances. 81 The Court
takes this broad approach because every future CWA case will be unique
and fact specific and therefore, the judge can utilize the various factors to
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1470. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1475 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 at 771).
Id.
County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1476.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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determine whether the discharge is a direct discharge or the functional
equivalent.82 The Court created a non-exhaustive list of several factors for
courts to consider when grappling with like cases:
(1) [T]ransit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the
material through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to
which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels,
(5) the amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative
to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the
manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable
waters, (7) the degree to which the pollution (at that point) has
maintained its specific identity.83
The court emphasized the two principal factors will be time and distance. 84
Courts will utilize these factors and the underlying objective of the CWA—
to protect the navigable waters of the United States—when determining
whether a permit is required. 85 This multi-factor approach should eliminate
loopholes to the permitting requirement and ensure the goal of the CWA
remains intact.86
1. Kavanaugh’s Concurrence
Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion which made three points of
disagreement with the majority opinion and other dissents filed. 87 First, the
majority’s holding is in line with the Court’s holding in Rapanos. The
County of Maui claims to not need a permit because the pollutants they are
discharging at the reclamation facility enter the groundwater and then
empty into navigable waters.88 Justice Kavanaugh argues the plurality
opinion in Rapanos explains why this application of the CWA is not
accurate.89 The plurality opinion in Rapanos held “the fact that the
pollutants from Maui’s wastewater facility reach the ocean via an indirect
route does not itself exempt Maui’s facility from the Clean Water Act’s
permitting requirement for point sources.” 90 Second, the source of
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1476.
County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1476-7.
Id.
Id. at 1477.
Id.
Id. at 1478. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id.
County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1478. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id.
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vagueness that the majority opinion discusses in its holding is not the
Court’s fault, rather from the CWA itself. 91 The CWA provides no “brightline test” to determine when a pollutant comes from a point source. 92 Third,
the majority does indicate relevant factors for courts to consider, despite
Justice Thomas’ dissent, when “determining whether pollutants that enter
navigable waters come ‘from’ a point source” and how courts can
determine the meaning of the majority’s “functional equivalent of a direct
discharge” rule.93 The Court discussed several possible factors that might be
relevant when grappling with a similar issue with particular emphasis on
time and distance. 94 The list of factors provided by the majority is a nonexhaustive list and judges will utilize these factors, and others, depending
on the facts of the case. 95 Ultimately, Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the
majority opinion that the Ninth Circuit decision ought to be vacated and the
case remanded.
2. Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas wrote one of two dissents in County of Maui.96 Justice
Thomas takes a textual approach to the CWA and dissents because the
majority conducted an “open-ended inquiry into congressional intent and
practical considerations.”97 Justice Thomas looks at the statutory definition
of “discharge” coupled with “addition” instead of “from,” like the majority
does.98 Explaining “addition” is more practical because with “to” and
“from” it limits the meaning of “discharge” regarding navigable waters. 99
Justice Thomas agrees with the majority, Rapanos does not resolve the
present case, because the Court in Rapanos issued a plurality opinion as the
Court could not reach a decision and the present Court is not bound by
dictum in a plurality opinion. 100 In conclusion, Justice Thomas states “[t]he
best reading of the statute is that a ‘discharge’ is the release of pollutants

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1478. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
94. Id. (“Although the statutory text does not supply a bright-line test, the Court’s
emphasis on time and distance will help guide application of the statutory standard going
forward.”), supra note 16.
95. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. 1478 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1478. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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directly from a point source to navigable waters” as there is no “discharge”
the judgment of the Ninth Circuit should be reversed. 101
3. Alito’s Dissent
The second dissent, written by Justice Alito, is extremely critical of the
majority’s holding for making up its own rules and in doing so, creating a
rule that is difficult to apply and will no doubt lead to future ambiguities. 102
Justice Alito argues “[t]here is no comprehensible alternative to these two
interpretations, but the Court refuses to accept either. Both alternatives, it
believes, lead to unacceptable results, and it therefore tries to find a middle
way.”103 The “functional equivalent of a direct discharge” or “when there is
a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters” test that the
majority created, “has no clear meaning.”104 Justice Alito defined the
CWA’s permit provision to read as “a permit is required when a pollutant is
discharged directly from a point source to navigable waters.” Or, put
another way, “if water discharged on the surface of the land finds or creates
a passage leading to navigable waters, a permit may be required if the
course that the discharge takes is (1) a ‘conveyance’ that is (2) ‘discernible’
and (3) ‘confined.’”105 Justice Alito argues this definition is consistent with
both the statutory language of the CWA and with the CWA’s regulatory
scheme and therefore, should be adopted. 106
III. County of Maui Heavily Turns on Statutory Interpretation
The main point of contention amongst the majority, concurrence, and
dissents in County of Maui is how to interpret the CWA. 107 When the
statute is unclear, different Courts and judges utilize different non-textual
sources to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statute. 108 Whereas, “[i]f
the text is sufficiently clear, the text usually controls.” 109 As the language of
101. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1482. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
102. See generally Id. at 1482-92 (Alito, J., dissenting), for criticism of the majority for
creating an ambiguous and inconsistent rule in their attempt to clarify the CWA.
103. Id. at 1483.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1487.
106. Id. at 1488.
107. See generally 140 S.Ct. 1462 (2020), for discussion of the meaning of “from” in the
CWA as argued the entire opinion.
108. Robert A. Katzmann, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2118
(2016).
109. Id.
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the CWA, regarding transferences by groundwater, is not clear, the Court in
County of Maui turned to several alternative sources to decipher the
statute’s meaning and Congress’s intent. 110 The Court discussed several
methods of statutory interpretation in County of Maui, such as legislative
intent, legislative purpose, agency interpretation, and plain language, to
name a few. 111 Ultimately, the Court determined the agency interpretation
of the CWA was improper and took a more purposivist and textualist
approach to the ambiguous language of the CWA. Combining aspects of
purposivism and textualism allowed for a rule encompasses both the
language of the statute, Congress’s intent, and precedent. In turn, the
majority created a rule that will lead to easier interpretation of the CWA in
future cases by providing judges, lawyers, and laypeople a non-exhaustive
list of factors and an articulation of Congress’s intent to guide
interpreters.112
A. The EPA’s Interpretative Statement Regarding the CWA and
Groundwater
1. Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes
The Supreme Court has long held that “[w]hen faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.”113 And, that “administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” 114 Chevron deference is
derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.:115

110. See generally Id., for the majority discussion of Congress’s intent in enacting the
CWA; see also Id. at 1484-5, for Justice Alito opinion on the textual construction of the
CWA and the plain meaning of “from.”
111. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and
Statutory Interpretation 219 (2nd ed. 2006).
112. See County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1476-7 (discussing the various factors for courts to
rely upon when determining whether a discharge is “the functional equivalent of a direct
discharge.”).
113. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
114. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001).
115. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme,” and “the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations ‘has been
consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the
meaning . . . of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy in the given situation has depended upon more than
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations.’
In other words, Chevron is step zero of statutory construction, that asks
two questions.116 The first question courts ask is, “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”117 On the
other hand, if “the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation.”118 And second, “if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on permissible construction of the
statute.”119 Permissible meaning whether the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.120 If the interpretation appears to be “reasonable,” the court
“should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.”
An agency, like the EPA, is better informed to discuss matters of the
CWA than the average lawyer or judge because the EPA has more
specialized knowledge on the subject.121 An agency’s specialized
116. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 111,
at 328 (“Perhaps the best way to understand Chevron is as articulating a default rule of
statutory construction: if statutory text is ambiguous, and Congress has delegated rulemaking
authority to an agency, courts should presume that Congress also intended to delegate to the
agency the power to say what the law is.”).
117. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
118. Id. at 842-3.
119. Id.
120. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 111,
at 328.
121. Id. at 323 (“In construing statutes, agencies consider the same sources private
lawyers and public judges do (statutory test, legislative history, and purpose), but they are
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knowledge is gained from expertise in the area as well as “practical
experience.”122 However, while an agency, like the EPA, might have the
practical experience and expertise to speak to the interpretation of an
ambiguous or vague statute, that is not to say agencies do not take
“statutory policy in . . . troubling directions.” 123 A good example of an
agency taking a statutory policy in a troubling direction is the EPA’s
interpretive statement regarding groundwater and the CWA, issued in April
2019.124 While Chevron is considered to be good law, “the Court has
recently spurned the framework in major cases involving agency statutory
interpretations.”125
2. EPA’s Interpretative Statement Under the Trump Administration
In April 2019, the EPA issued the Interpretive Statement on Application
of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to Groundwater
(“Statement”):
After receiving more than 50,000 comments from the public, and
after the Ninth Circuit released its opinion in [County of Maui],
[the] EPA wrote that ‘the best, if not the only, reading’ of the
statutory provisions is that ‘all releases of pollutants to
groundwater’ are excluded from the scope of the permitting
program, ‘even where pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional
surface waters via groundwater.’126

also better informed about the statutory history and the practicality of competing policies
than courts are.”).
122. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 234-235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 139-140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944).
123. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 111,
at 323.
124. See generally Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point
Source to Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16810 (April 23, 2019), for the EPA’s opinion on the
issue discussed at length in County of Maui, yet not utilized in the case due to recent change
in the agency’s opinion.
125. Note, The Rise of Purposivism and Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the
Supreme Court, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1227, 1227 (2017).
126. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1474 (citing 84 Fed. Reg. 16810, 16811).
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The statement, released just one month after the amending of the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui,127 aimed to
alleviate confusion regarding the CWA’s stance on groundwater. 128 The
EPA, under the Trump Administration, reached the conclusion that the
CWA does not require a permit under the NPDES for any pollutants
released from a point source to groundwater, regardless of the connection
between the groundwater and the navigable water. 129 Meaning, persons
would be allowed to pollute groundwater before it empties into surface
water without being required to apply for a NPDES permit. Even in
instances where the pollutant is only added a few feet before emptying into
navigable water, like an ocean. This interpretation of the CWA is troubling
for several reasons, but mostly because it would allow a loophole in the
CWA’s permit requirement to continue.
3. County of Maui’s Decision to Forego Utilizing EPA’s Interpretive
Statement
While Chevron is the customary rule for courts to apply in situations
where the language of a statute is vague and ambiguous, the Court in
County of Maui chose to forego Chevron and the EPA’s recent Interpretive
Statement. 130 The Court explained that aside from no party to the lawsuit
asking for the Statement to be utilized in the Court’s decision, the danger of
implementing such Statement would create a serious loophole to the
CWA’s permit requirement.131 To rely upon the Statement in the Court’s
decision in County of Maui would allow polluters to bypass the CWA’s
permit requirement, NPDES, by polluting into groundwater instead of
navigable waters even if the groundwater emptied into navigable waters
only a few feet from the discharge point. Thus, contradicting years of CWA
jurisprudence and disregarding the very reason Congress enacted such
legislation in the first place.132 The whole purpose of the CWA is to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.”133
127. 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018).
128. 84 Fed. Reg. 16810 (April 23, 2019).
129. Id.
130. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1474.
131. Id.
132. Jon Devine and David Henkin, Closing a Concocted Clean Water Act Loophole,
The Regulatory Review (July 20, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/20/devinehenkin-closing-concocted-clean-water-act-loophole/.
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
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The reason for the Court and this Notes emphasis on what administration
this Statement was issued under is “[b]ecause agencies generally give
greater weight to policy and statutory purpose and may be swayed by
political pressure from the President, Congress, and interest groups, they be
more likely than courts to bend the text and supersede the original
legislative expectations than courts.”134 Chevron places a lot of confidence
in a body of people that are so easily swayed by external pressures.
Thankfully, the Court and the parties in County of Maui did not utilize—or
even ask to utilize—this interpretation and the waters of the U.S. remain
protected by the CWA from pollutants via groundwater through the act’s
permit system.
B. Theories of Statutory Interpretation and How they Relate to County of
Maui
While the Court chose to forego Chevron, it did utilize other means of
statutory interpretation in its County of Maui decision. Although there are
numerous approaches to statutory interpretation, for the purpose of this
Note, we will be analyzing two of the more popular approaches:
purposivism and textualism. Purposivism and textualism “seek to construct
an objective intent because “[t]he actual intent of the legislature that passed
a given statute is usually unknowable with respect to the precise situation
presented to the court.”135 The goal of both purposivism and textualism is to
interpret statutes by keeping Congress’s intent in mind. 136 While both
theories have similarities, they differ on “the best way to determine [the]
objective intent [of Congress].”137 Purposivism focuses on ensuring
Congress’s purpose for enacting such legislation is at the forefront of the
interpretation process of an ambiguous statute while textualism focuses on
the actual words of the statute to decipher ambiguity. 138 To summarize in
the simplest of terms, “textualist and legal process purposivist opinions
account for both semantic and policy context, but textualist opinions
prioritize semantic context, whereas legal process purposivist opinions

134. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 111,
at 333.
135. Valerie C. Brannon, Cong. Research Serv., Statutory Interpretation: Theories,
Tools, and Trends 11 (2018).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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prioritize policy context.”139 Purposivism and textualism are both evident
throughout the decision in County of Maui.
1. Purposivism Defined and Aspects of Purposivism in County of Maui
Purposivism has been around since the sixteenth century and said to rise
as Chevron has fallen out of use, reinforcing judicial power. 140 Purposivism
“attempts to achieve the democratic legitimacy of other intentionalist
theories in a way that renders statutory interpretation adaptable to new
circumstances.”141 It does so by “taking into account the problem that
Congress was trying to solve by enacting the disputed law and asking how
the statute accomplished that goal.” 142 A purposivist argues “judges should
pay attention to ‘how Congress makes its purposes known, through text and
reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history.’” 143 A
judge “can best observe legislative supremacy by paying attention to the
legislative process.”144 Purposivism asks “‘[w]hat was the statute’s goal?’
rather than ‘[w]hat did the drafters specifically intend?’” 145 This allows for
analysis of “new or unforeseen circumstances” which is why purposivism is
said to be adaptable.146
However, “[p]urposivism does not yield determinate answers when there
is no neutral way to arbitrate among different purposes.”147 So,
Even if there were agreement as to which purpose should be
attributed to a statute, the analysis in the hard cases might still be
indeterminate. Often an attributed policy purpose is too general
and malleable to yield interpretive closure in specific cases,
because its application will depend heavily upon context and the
interpreter’s perspective. Not only are such judgments difficult,
but they implicate political and policy considerations better
139. Note, The Rise of Purposivism and Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the
Supreme Court, supra note 125, at 1229.
140. See generally Id., for discussion of the rise of purposivism and the fall of Chevron
amongst the various Courts over the years.
141. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 111,
at 229.
142. See Valerie C. Brannon, supra note 135.
143. Id. at 12 (citing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 31 (2014)).
144. Id.
145. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 111,
at 230.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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suited to the branches that are more democratically accountable
than the judiciary.148
While purposivism is a theory of statutory interpretation, it does not
necessarily create a finite and rigid test, or rule, every time it is utilized. 149
Purposivism goes further and accounts for the specificity and unique
characteristics of each case. 150
Not producing a rigid rule is frustrating for judges, lawyers, and
laypersons; however, it creates the ability for statutes and rules to adapt
over time and account for change. A purposivist approach to the CWA
would look at the goal of Congress in enacting the CWA, relying on
legislative history and other non-textual sources. A purposivist would also
analyze the legislative history of the statute to determine whether Congress
achieved its goal in creating the legislation. The Supreme Court’s decision
in County of Maui has many aspects of purposivism embedded in the
Court’s analysis. The majority looks to the legislative history of the CWA
to determine whether the EPA’s interpretive statement was consistent with
CWA jurisprudence and ultimately decided it was not consistent with the
statute’s purpose. 151 Another aspect of purposivism is evident in the
majority’s “functional equivalent of a direct discharge” test, 152 a rule that is
heavily criticized for being overly broad and ambiguous. However, a
purposivist would argue that due to the complexity of CWA jurisprudence
and how fact specific each case is, a broad rule is desirable.
Justice Alito and Justice Thomas both criticize, in their separate dissents,
the majority’s inability to create a rule that future courts can utilize. 153
Justice Thomas goes as far to say “save for a list of seven factors” judges
are left on their own to decipher this new rule crafted by the majority. 154
However, bright line rules are not always the answer, especially with a
statute like the CWA that is so purposely vague and yields cases that are so
fact specific.155 The factors articulated by the majority in County of Maui

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1475 (2020).
Id. at 1476.
Id. at 1480 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Id. at 1483 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1480 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
County of Maui, supra note 14.
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allow for evolution and change. 156 And, will ultimately lead to more
continuity in future holdings. A loophole in the CWA was nearly created
because courts focused too narrowly on the interpretation of the CWA
instead of focusing on the goal of Congress. Future courts will likely not
lose sight of the goal of the CWA because it is embedded in the analysis
judges will utilize in future like cases.
2. Textualism Defined and Aspects of Textualism in County of Maui
Justice Kagan said, “we’re all textualists now.”157 Textualism looks to
the plain meaning of a statute as a guide for determining how to apply a
statute and is arguably the best approach to statutory interpretation because
it looks to the literal meaning of the words that make up the vague or
ambiguous statute.158 Textualism has recently been defined as “the meaning
an ordinary speaker of the English language would draw from the statutory
text is the alpha and the omega of statutory interpretation.” 159 While some
textualists, like Justice Scalia, argue that a judge “should almost never
consult, and never rely on, the legislative history of a statute,” 160 some
textualist judges might look to dictionaries and previous provisions of the
statute to help provide context.161 A big difference between purposivism
and textualism is that textualism does not look to legislative history while
purposivism does.
The central question in County of Maui focuses on the meaning of the
word “from.”162 Both parties argue what the word “from” entails and their
definitions of the word.163 The majority looks to the definition of each word
in the CWA in their attempt to interpret the statute in a groundwater
context.164 While the majority does look to the textual meaning of the
156. See County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1476-7 (discussing the factors a judge should
consider when determining whether groundwater conveyances are included under the
CWA).
157. See Robert A. Katzmann, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 108 (quoting
Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of
Statutes at 8:09 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagandiscusses-statutory-interpretation [http://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR]).
158. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 111,
at 231.
159. Id. at 236.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. 1462, 1470 (2020).
163. Id.
164. See generally Id. at 1462-1492.
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CWA, they also rely on the intent of Congress and look to other non-textual
sources other than dictionaries, making the “functional equivalent a direct
discharge”165 test a combination of purposivism and textualism. Justice
Thomas’s dissent is a great example of a textualist approach to an
ambiguous statute.166 He looks at the context of the word “discharge” and
determines that “to” and “from” limit “discharge” to “the augmentation of
navigable waters.”167 He then looks to the dictionary definition, referencing
various dictionary definitions.168 Plus, what makes Justice Thomas’s dissent
a classic textualist approach to statutory interpretation is that he does not
rely on the legislative intent of the CWA, merely the statute’s structure and
the plain meaning of the words of the CWA. 169
IV. County of Maui’s Impact on CWA Jurisprudence: Will There Be More
Ambiguity and Inconsistency in Holdings Post County of Maui?
The combination of both purposivism and textualism in the County of
Maui decision shows the Court used and blended several statutory
interpretation methods to determine the meaning of the CWA in the context
of groundwater conveyances. 170 The Court’s emphasis on Congress’s intent
and the meaning of the language of the CWA shows the “functional
equivalent of a direct discharge” test was not created on a whim or merely
to answer the question before the Court the way they wanted to. 171 While
the test created in County of Maui is vague, it is the best way to approach
future CWA cases because it ensures States’s rights and Congress’s intent
are accounted for; it also recognizes the complexity of CWA jurisprudence
and how fact specific cases are. A non-exhaustive list of factors for courts
to utilize need not mean inconsistent holdings and ambiguity , it means
quite the opposite and that is evident in the theory of purposivism. 172
Purposivism ensures the goal of Congress remains the same even as time
changes and new difficulties arise. The factors discussed in County of Maui
165. Id. at 1468.
166. See generally Id. at 1479-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting), for Justice Thomas’s textualist
approach to interpreting an ambiguous statute.
167. Id. at 1479.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1479-82.
170. See discussion supra, Part III.B.
171. See County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1482-3 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s “functional equivalent of a direct discharge” test for leading to more future
inconsistencies in CWA jurisprudence.).
172. See discussion supra note 16; see also supra discussion Part III.B.1.
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ensure this decision can withstand change and complex cases because they
provide a parameter for judges to analyze when determining whether said
conveyance by groundwater is protected under the CWA’s permit
requirement. 173
Even though Justice Thomas believes the Court is not bound by dictum
from the plurality opinion in Rapanos,174 the majority opinion in County of
Maui coupled with a broad reading of Rapanos, creates a precedent that
most groundwater conveyances will be protected under the CWA. And
now, it is no longer dictum that protects groundwater but a case-by-case
analysis of the facts.
Justice Alito’s dissent objects to the majority’s test because he argues the
majority ignores Congress’s intent for enacting the CWA. 175 He argues the
majority made its own rule t to answer the question before the Court. 176
Justice Alito is critical of the majority’s decision to create a new rule and
one that is both ambiguous and difficult for future courts to follow. 177 In
turn, causing inconsistent holdings .178 However, Justice Alito’s criticism
does not give the majority’s “functional equivalent of a direct discharge”
rule enough credit. The majority recognized how broad the rule they were
implementing in County of Maui was.179 Not only did they directly
acknowledge the lack of “middle instances,” they provided a nonexhaustive list of factors for future courts to utilize in like cases.180 So much
of CWA cases depend on specific facts. 181 Facts centered on distance
pollutants traveled to reach navigable water, amount of time it took for
pollutants to enter navigable waters, and so on.182 And while it is easy to
determine the extreme answers to those questions, the middle instances are
easier to grapple with when remembering the purpose of the CWA and the
reason for Congress enacting such legislation. If the CWA is to protect “the
waters of the United States” from pollutants, then a reclamation site
discharging pollutants into groundwater that ultimately empties into the
Pacific Ocean goes against the purpose of the CWA. Taking a step back to
173. See discussion supra note 16.
174. See County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1482 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We are not bound
by dictum in a plurality opinion or by the lower court opinions it cited.”).
175. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1482-3 (Alito, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1476.
180. Id. at 1476-7.
181. County of Maui, 140 S.Ct. at 1477.
182. Id.
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look at Congress’s goal behind the CWA ensures future courts issue
consistent holdings. Justice Alito and Justice Thomas wrongly criticize this
purposivist and textualist approach to the CWA. The majority rule prevents
a loophole to the permit requirement that would go against the statute’s
structure, language, and purpose. Therefore, the holding in the majority is
the correct decision.
Yes, “the functional equivalent of a direct discharge” sounds like
meaningless words compiled together but analyzing them contextually, they
make sense. If the source of the discharge is known and their pollutants are
clearly ascertainable, it should not matter how it arrived at the “navigable
water.” The CWA’s permit requirement was created to ensure that if you
are polluting to navigable waters, you are required to file for a permit to
ensure you are complying with the EPA and the CWA. The permit
requirement protects navigable waters from pollutants directly discharged
into navigable waters or discharged to groundwater which ultimately
empties into navigable waters. Either way, the discharge is ascertainable so
the means of travel should not matter.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the majority decision in County of Maui was correct. The
majority articulated a rule which accounted for Congress’s intent, States’s
rights, and the EPA’s expressed duty in the CWA, but it also provided
parameters—to the greatest extent possible of such a simplistic, yet diverse,
statute. CWA jurisprudence is complex. Factors account for the complexity
of CWA cases and will help judges determine those middle instances that
the majority in County of Maui could not think of in the moment. The
majority in County of Maui articulated the CWA’s relation to groundwater
in a way that utilized Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute and actual
language of the text to ensure the waters of the United States are protected
from discharge via groundwater.
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